California's energy crisis a genuine national security emergency
The Critical Coast in Peril
National Security & Energy Policy Analysis — June 2026
California's self-inflicted energy crisis has created a genuine national security emergency — threatening the fuel supply, grid reliability, and operational readiness of the most densely concentrated collection of military power in the United States, at the precise moment the Pentagon is preparing for conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
I. The Strategic Stakes
The United States is engaged in one of the most consequential military buildups of the post-Cold War era, explicitly oriented toward deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative requested $9.9 billion in FY 2025 alone, making targeted investments to enhance U.S. force posture, infrastructure, and readiness in the region. The 2026 National Defense Strategy directs the Department of Defense to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring, in the strategy's own language, that "neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies." A conflict over Taiwan — officially designated by DoD as "the pacing scenario" — is the central planning assumption around which force structure, logistics, and basing decisions are organized.
The geographic node of American power projection toward the Indo-Pacific is California. The state hosts 44 military installations — more than any other state in the nation — supporting all six branches of the armed forces. Naval Base San Diego is the principal homeport of the Pacific Fleet, housing more than 50 ships. Camp Pendleton is the Marine Corps' primary West Coast expeditionary force. Travis Air Force Base operates the largest air mobility organization in the Air Force, handling more cargo and passengers than any other military air terminal in the United States. Vandenberg Space Force Base manages West Coast space launch and satellite operations for the Space Force, DoD, NASA, and commercial partners. Edwards Air Force Base conducts test and evaluation of advanced aircraft and hypersonic systems. NAS North Island hosts 23 aviation squadrons and the Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, San Diego's largest aerospace employer. NAWS China Lake is the Navy's premier weapons research, development, and testing installation.
This concentration of military power depends, at every operational level, on two things California's own governing policies are actively degrading: reliable grid electricity and liquid fuel refined from crude petroleum.
II. The Scale of the Military-Economic Nexus
The relationship between California's economy and its military presence is not a peripheral government sector — it is a structural pillar of the state's economic base that dwarfs most individual industries.
According to the 2024 California Statewide National Security Economic Impacts Study, conducted by the California Research Bureau and released in October 2025, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs combined employ approximately 340,000 Californians, including 162,000 active-duty and 56,000 reserve service members, as well as 122,000 civilian employees. National security activity produces $158.2 billion in economic impact across California — approximately 4.7% of the state's total economy. Federal tax revenue from national security activity alone totals $20.4 billion annually.
California received $60.8 billion in total federal defense spending, making it the third-highest defense-spending state after Virginia and Texas. It held the third-largest share of national security-related contracts in FY 2023, at $35 billion, trailing only Texas ($66.8 billion) and Virginia. Defense and security activities contributed an estimated 5.1% to California's GDP, equal to approximately $196.7 billion in 2023.
- Total military installations: 44 — more than any other state
- Active-duty personnel: 161,000+
- Reserve personnel: 56,000
- DoD/DHS/VA civilian employees: 122,000 — second-highest in U.S.
- Total national security economic impact: $158.2 billion (4.7% of state GDP)
- Federal defense spending received: $60.8 billion (3rd nationally)
- National security contracts (FY 2023): $35.0 billion (3rd nationally)
- Federal tax revenue from national security activity: $20.4 billion
- Californians' net contribution to federal treasury (FY 2024): $275.6 billion more paid than received — largest of any state
- California GDP (2024): $4.048 trillion — largest state economy; 5th-largest national economy globally
The federal fiscal stakes extend well beyond the defense sector. California paid approximately $275.6 billion more to the federal government than it received in return in FY 2024 — the largest net contributor to the federal treasury of any state. With a GDP of $4.048 trillion, California generates approximately 14% of U.S. gross domestic product. Any serious structural deterioration of the California economy — through energy cost escalation, industrial flight, or infrastructure failure — carries direct and immediate implications for federal revenue, federal deficit dynamics, and the fiscal capacity to sustain the very defense buildup the Indo-Pacific strategy requires.
III. The Energy Island — A Unique and Worsening Vulnerability
California's energy supply situation is structurally unique among large U.S. states, and uniquely vulnerable. The distinction is captured in a term that has entered the analytical vocabulary of energy security specialists: California is an "energy island."
The Sierra Nevada mountain range creates an absolute barrier to petroleum pipeline connectivity. There are no crude oil pipelines linking California to the Permian Basin, the midcontinent, or any domestic production east of the Rockies. Every barrel of crude refined in California must be produced in-state, shipped from Alaska, or delivered by tanker — from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Brazil, Ecuador, or Asia. As Stillwater Associates, an energy market consultancy, summarized in a March 2026 analysis: "The West Coast operates as an effective island from a fuels perspective. There are no crude oil pipelines connecting this market to production east of the Rockies, and in-state crude production, particularly in California, is now just a shadow of its former self."
This structural isolation creates a coupling between state refinery capacity and military readiness that has no analogue in Texas, Virginia, or any other major military-hosting state. In California, when a refinery closes, there is no pipeline from Houston available to replace the output. The replacement must come by tanker — across oceans, through sea lanes that China's People's Liberation Army Navy is actively contesting, and processed to California's unique reformulated fuel blend specifications that most foreign refineries are not equipped to produce.
California also uniquely specifies its own gasoline blend — CARBOB (California Reformulated Gasoline Blendstock for Oxygenate Blending) — with requirements so distinct from standard U.S. specifications that most domestic refineries east of the Rockies cannot produce it. This blend specification, designed to reduce smog-forming emissions, eliminates the competitive market that would otherwise allow California to source product from Gulf Coast refineries in an emergency. When California's refinery capacity contracts, there is effectively no domestic backup.
IV. The Refinery Collapse and Its Military Consequences
The California refinery crisis documented in the companion analysis is not merely a consumer affordability issue. It is a direct military logistics problem, and Congress has begun saying so explicitly.
Representative Vince Fong (R-CA-20), writing in late 2025, put the national security dimensions in precise operational terms: "Military aviation fuels are highly specialized and of the highest grades, which California's refineries are equipped to process. In 2024, California's military installations consumed approximately 10 million gallons of gasoline. With the two most recent refinery closures, jet fuel production is estimated to decrease by at least 600,000 gallons a day." He noted that the state hosts dozens of military installations under U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, where service members must be ready to deploy worldwide on short notice — readiness that depends on reliable fuel access.
The Department of Energy formalized the federal government's concern in an April 2026 fact sheet: "President Trump is reducing California's dependence on foreign oil, after state policies left Californian residents and more than 30 U.S. military installations vulnerable." The fact sheet noted that California's foreign oil imports had tripled over the last 20 years, that 60% of crude supplied to California refineries is imported from foreign countries, and that the number of operating refineries had dropped from 23 in 2000 to 12 as of April 2026 — with a further reduction to 11 anticipated by May 2026.
The DoD itself has long acknowledged the underlying structural vulnerability. A Pentagon assessment documented years ago stated: "Military installations are almost completely dependent on a fragile and vulnerable commercial power grid, placing critical military and homeland defense missions at unacceptable risk of extended outage." That grid dependency, combined with the fuel supply vulnerability created by the refinery closures, creates a compounding risk profile that no other major military concentration in the nation faces in equivalent form.
Chevron, in formal regulatory comments on CARB's proposed Cap-and-Invest amendments submitted in 2026, stated directly: "California's in-state refining system plays an important role in supporting U.S. energy security, national defense, including more than 30 military defense installations in the state that could be compromised if this policy is finalized... Refinery closures in California reduce fuel supply resilience on the West Coast, increasing risks to military readiness and national security."
V. The Federal Response — Executive Action and the Overreach Question
The federal government has not been passive in the face of these concerns. The Trump administration's actions constitute the most aggressive federal intervention in a state's domestic energy policy in modern American history — one that raises profound questions about federalism, constitutional authority, and the limits of national security justification.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump's first day in office, he issued Executive Order 14156, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency" under the National Emergencies Act, finding that the United States' "insufficient energy and critical minerals" production constituted "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States." The emergency was renewed for a second year on January 14, 2026, through a Federal Register notice citing continued threats to national security and the economy.
On April 8, 2025, Trump issued a second relevant executive order, "Protecting American Energy From State Overreach," which asserted that state and local laws undermining American energy dominance "are or may be unconstitutional, preempted by Federal law, or otherwise unenforceable." The order directed the Attorney General to identify all such state and local laws and recommend action, including federal litigation. California was the primary target, though the order applied nationally.
On April 20, 2026, Trump issued presidential memoranda to Energy Secretary Chris Wright invoking the Defense Production Act (DPA) to accelerate investment in domestic energy infrastructure across multiple fuel types, citing EO 14156's national energy emergency as the legal predicate. The memoranda determined that specified categories of energy resources "constitute industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items essential to the national defense," authorizing federal intervention in energy infrastructure development without the normal procedural requirements.
The legal architecture of these interventions is contested. California has filed or joined litigation challenging several federal actions, arguing that they exceed presidential authority, violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and represent unconstitutional preemption of state regulatory authority. The broader constitutional tension — between the federal government's national security prerogatives and a state's police powers over energy and environmental regulation — is likely to produce Supreme Court litigation before the decade ends.
What is not contested is the underlying factual predicate for federal concern. The DoE fact sheet of April 2026 documents conditions — 30+ military installations dependent on a vulnerable energy system, foreign import dependence at 60% of crude supply, refinery count declining from 23 to 11, residential electricity prices at 30.29 cents/kWh versus a national average of 17.45 cents — that represent genuine strategic vulnerabilities regardless of their political framing.
VI. The Grid Dimension — Military Readiness and Commercial Dependence
The Atlantic Council's March 2026 assessment of defense installation energy resilience put the structural problem precisely: "U.S. military power projection begins at home, with installations across the continental United States serving as hubs for command, force generation, logistics, and access to space and cyber domains. Yet these bases are deeply dependent on electricity systems that are increasingly vulnerable. Aging infrastructure, rising demand from advanced technologies, more frequent extreme weather, and mounting cyber threats all pose risks to the reliable power needed for mission readiness."
California's commercial grid improvements in recent years are real and documented. The CAISO 2025 Summer Assessment showed a surplus of 1,451 megawatts against the standard planning target. Battery storage capacity reached 10,781 MW by December 2024, with an additional 3,372 MW added between September 2024 and April 2025. California did not issue a single Flex Alert in 2023, 2024, or 2025 despite periods of extreme heat. These are genuine achievements.
But the CAISO's own assessment acknowledges their limits. Its 2025 Summer Assessment explicitly states that results "do not take into account extreme events — extreme drought, wildfires, and the potential for widespread regional heating events — that continue to pose a risk for emergency conditions." The 2025 NERC Summer Reliability Assessment for California specifically identified wildfires threatening the California-Oregon Intertie and 500 kV transmission lines as risks that could create import capability limitations. In 2025, Southern California Edison recorded nearly 526,000 customers affected by Public Safety Power Shutoffs through August alone — against 137,000 for all of 2024 and 34,000 for all of 2023. The trend is accelerating in the wrong direction.
Military installations face a specific regulatory constraint that civilian customers do not: California does not allow Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) to run while grid-tied, on air quality grounds. This means that bases cannot use their backup generation capacity to reduce commercial grid load or to self-insure against brief outages — they must be fully disconnected from the grid before backup generators can operate. In a cyber or physical attack scenario targeting grid infrastructure, the transition time creates a window of vulnerability for critical defense systems.
The Department of the Air Force addressed this directly at its California Installation Commanders' Caucus, held at Vandenberg Space Force Base in February 2025, where installation commanders from Air and Space Force installations across the state convened to address energy resilience, grid dependency, and microgrid development. The Bipartisan GRID Act, introduced in the Senate in July 2024 by Senators Cortez Masto and Mullin, explicitly sought to address the coupling between military installations and vulnerable commercial grids — recognizing that the dependency was a systemic risk requiring federal-level solutions.
CAISO's vice president Mark Rothleder acknowledged the cyber dimension directly in public comments: "We are always being attacked. We have mechanisms in place… but it's constantly changing. It's a constantly evolving threat we have to defend against." The grid that California's military installations depend on is simultaneously the target of persistent adversary cyber operations and an increasingly fragile physical infrastructure subject to wildfire disruption.
VII. The Indo-Pacific Scenario — What a Taiwan Conflict Demands of California
Congressional Research Service analysis confirms that California hosts the primary Indo-Pacific-focused installations of the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force: Naval Base San Diego, Camp Pendleton, Travis Air Force Base, and Vandenberg Space Force Base are specifically identified as the principal California nodes for force generation and projection toward the Pacific theater.
A Taiwan conflict scenario — the DoD's stated "pacing scenario" — would require rapid deployment of naval and Marine expeditionary forces from San Diego; maximum utilization of Travis AFB's airlift capacity for personnel, equipment, and sustainment; continuous satellite launch and constellation maintenance from Vandenberg; and sustained combat aircraft testing and operational support from Edwards and China Lake. Each of these missions requires uninterrupted, high-quality fuel supply and grid reliability measured not in hours but in weeks and months of sustained high-operational-tempo conditions.
The fuel dependency creates a cascade vulnerability that runs directly through California's "energy island" status. In a conflict scenario involving China, the adversary would have every incentive and significant capability to disrupt the tanker supply routes that California increasingly depends on to replace the refining capacity its own regulations have eliminated. Chinese naval and anti-ship missile capabilities in the Western Pacific could threaten the tanker routes from the Persian Gulf through the South China Sea and from South Korea and Japan to West Coast ports. The scenario in which California's military installations face fuel shortages precisely because the state's policy environment drove out the in-state refining capacity that would have been strategically immune to Pacific sea-lane interdiction is not hypothetical — it is the logical extrapolation of current policy trends.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in his 2025 posture statement to Congress, confirmed that the Indo-Pacific "remains the Department of Defense's priority theater" and documented an expanding Chinese military modernization effort including expanded maritime capabilities in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait backed by modern naval forces. His statement referenced Defense Fuel Support Points throughout the Indo-Pacific theater as critical logistics nodes — nodes whose West Coast supply chain runs through California's shrinking refinery system.
VIII. The Federal Tax Base Dimension
The national security concern about California's energy infrastructure is not limited to operational military readiness. There is a second-order fiscal dimension that is less visible but equally significant: the federal government's dependence on California's economy as the largest single contributor to the federal revenue base.
In FY 2024, Californians paid approximately $275.6 billion more to the federal government than they received — the largest net contributor figure of any state, representing the margin without which the federal deficit would be materially larger. California's GDP of $4.048 trillion represents approximately 14% of U.S. economic output. Any structural economic deterioration in California — driven by energy cost escalation, industrial disinvestment, business and taxpayer outmigration, or infrastructure failure — directly reduces the federal revenue available to fund defense and other federal programs.
The feedback loop is precise and quantifiable. California's top 1% of income taxpayers generate approximately half of the state's personal income tax revenue. Personal income tax collections at the federal level from California are concentrated in capital gains-heavy technology sector income. If the energy cost environment — residential electricity at 30.29 cents/kWh against a national average of 17.45 cents, gasoline at $4.58 per gallon against a national average of $2.92 — drives business relocation, workforce outmigration, or suppresses economic activity, the loss flows through immediately to federal revenue. The $9.9 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative budget and the broader $921 billion defense budget are funded, in non-trivial part, by the economic vitality of the state whose energy policies are creating the vulnerabilities that defense funding is meant to counteract.
This is the fiscal irony that Washington's national security establishment has begun to articulate: the state that is most critical to the federal revenue base, and that hosts the most critical concentration of military power for the priority theater, is simultaneously implementing energy policies that undermine both the revenue base and the military readiness. The federal interest in California's energy infrastructure is not partisan politics. It is institutional self-preservation.
IX. Proposed Solutions and Their Adequacy
Several remedial initiatives are in various stages of development, though none addresses the full scope of the vulnerability.
The Western Gateway Pipeline, proposed by Phillips 66 and Kinder Morgan, would deliver gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel to California from as far east as Missouri via a 1,300-mile pipeline by 2029, ending California's status as a fuel island. This proposal represents the most structurally significant potential solution to the supply chain vulnerability — it would restore some degree of pipeline connectivity to domestic production. It faces significant regulatory and permitting hurdles in California, and its 2029 projected completion date means it does not address the near-term window of maximum vulnerability created by the 2025-2026 refinery closures.
Microgrid and energy resilience programs at military installations represent the DoD's institutional response to grid dependency risk. The Army has committed to equipping all bases with microgrids by 2035. The Navy has a goal to make key installations capable of operating off-grid for at least two weeks. The DoD's Idaho National Laboratory broke ground in September 2024 on a transportable nuclear microreactor prototype that could power an entire base from a shipping-container-sized unit, with delivery to INL projected for 2026. These programs address the grid dependency problem without requiring cooperation from California's state government — but they require years and billions in investment to deploy at scale.
Trump's DPA invocation of April 2026 signals federal intent to use national defense authority to accelerate energy infrastructure investment, including in California, over state regulatory objections. The legal theory — that energy infrastructure constitutes "industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items essential to the national defense" — has not been fully tested in court but draws on established precedent for federal preemption of state regulation when genuine national security interests are at stake.
None of these measures addresses the foundational problem: the state's regulatory environment continues to make California refineries economically unviable, its unique fuel blend requirements prevent domestic supply substitution, and its electricity pricing structure — 96% above 2014 levels by 2026 — erodes the economic base that supports the military-industrial complex the state hosts.
X. The Compound Failure
The national security analysis of California's energy situation arrives at a conclusion that the state's governing class has resisted acknowledging: the intersection of good intentions, institutional siloing, and single-variable policy optimization has produced a genuine strategic liability.
California's policymakers did not design their energy policies with the intention of undermining military readiness or weakening the federal revenue base. They designed them to reduce greenhouse gas emissions — an objective that is itself a legitimate national security concern, as the 2025 Munich Security Conference panel on climate and security made clear. But the institutional failure mode that systems thinkers identify — treating the policy's target variable as the only variable, allowing second and third-order consequences to be managed by other agencies with different mandates — has produced exactly the kind of compounding vulnerability that adversary planners study and probe.
China's military planning explicitly considers the logistical vulnerabilities of U.S. force projection. An adversary studying California's energy situation in 2026 would note: a state that produces its own specialized fuel blend that cannot be sourced domestically from outside the state; a refinery system that has contracted by more than 50% over 25 years and is still declining; grid infrastructure dependent on wildfire-vulnerable transmission lines and subject to persistent cyber probing; military installations legally prevented from running backup generation while grid-connected; and a political environment in which the state government characterizes federal concern about these vulnerabilities as partisan attack rather than legitimate strategic assessment.
The combination of the "energy island" geographic reality, the regulatory-driven refinery collapse, the grid reliability constraints, and the political resistance to acknowledging the problem constitutes a threat profile that no amount of Pacific Deterrence Initiative investment can fully offset if the home station logistics base is undermined. Force projection requires force sustainment. Force sustainment requires fuel, electricity, and the industrial base to maintain the equipment that consumes them. California is the home station for more of that force than any other state.
The federal concern is legitimate, well-documented, and — on the available evidence — inadequately addressed by current state policy. Whether the November 2026 gubernatorial election produces a governor who treats it as such remains the pivotal near-term political question. The operational timeline of the Indo-Pacific threat will not wait for California's political cycles to resolve the systems failures its own policies have created.
National Security-Relevant Economic Summary
| Metric | California | National Context |
|---|---|---|
| Military installations | 44 (all branches) | Most of any state |
| Active-duty personnel | 161,000+ | 3rd nationally |
| DoD civilian employees | 122,000 | 2nd nationally (after Virginia) |
| Defense spending received | $60.8 billion | 3rd nationally |
| National security contracts (FY 2023) | $35 billion | 3rd nationally |
| National security economic impact | $158.2 billion (4.7% of GSP) | Major contributor to DoD sustainment |
| Net federal tax contribution (FY 2024) | +$275.6 billion (net payer) | Largest net contributor of any state |
| State GDP | $4.048 trillion (2024) | ~14% of U.S. GDP; 5th globally |
| Operating refineries (2026) | 11 (down from 23 in 2000) | Loss of 52% of capacity over 26 years |
| Foreign crude dependency | 60% of refinery crude supply imported | Was <6% from foreign sources 40 years ago |
| Residential electricity price | 30.29 cents/kWh | National average: 17.45 cents/kWh |
| Gasoline price (June 2026) | ~$4.58/gallon | National average: ~$2.92/gallon |
Sources and Citations
- California Research Bureau, California State Library. 2024 California Statewide National Security Economic Impacts Study. October 2025. https://www.library.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/crb-reports/2024_California_Statewide_MEIS.pdf
- Governor's Military Council, State of California. California Military Bases and Economic Data. https://militarycouncil.ca.gov/s_economicdata/
- Congressional Research Service. Defense Primer: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Updated February 5, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12604
- Congressional Research Service. U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report R47589. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47589
- U.S. Department of Defense. Pacific Deterrence Initiative — Department of Defense Budget FY 2025. https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Pacific_Deterrence_Initiative.pdf
- Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, USINDOPACOM. Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee — INDOPACOM Posture, 2025. https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/indopacom_posture_statement_2025.pdf
- U.S. Department of Energy. "Fact Sheet: California's War on American Energy Impoverishes Residents and Harms National Security." April 9, 2026. https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-californias-war-american-energy-impoverishes-residents-and-harms-national
- Executive Order 14156. Declaring a National Energy Emergency. January 20, 2025. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-14156-declaring-national-energy-emergency
- Federal Register. Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Energy. January 14, 2026. 90 Fed. Reg. 1668. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/14/2026-00732/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-energy
- White House. Executive Order: Protecting American Energy From State Overreach. April 8, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/protecting-american-energy-from-state-overreach/
- McGuireWoods. "Opening Potential Opportunities for Industry, President Trump Takes Action Under DPA to Unlock Federal Funding for Energy Infrastructure Projects." April 24, 2026. https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/alerts/2026/4/opening-potential-opportunities-for-industry-president-trump-takes-action-under-dpa/
- Congressman Vince Fong (CA-20). "Newsom's War on Energy Is Crippling California and Undermining Our Military." Op-ed, December 8, 2025. https://fong.house.gov/media/editorial/newsoms-war-energy-crippling-california-and-undermining-our-military
- Washington Examiner. "Newsom's Energy Policies Could Jeopardize National Security." November 24, 2025. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy-and-environment/3896978/gavin-newsom-energy-policies-could-jeopardize-security/
- Chevron Corporation. "California's Economy Faces Threats with New Energy Policy Changes." Regulatory comment to CARB, March 2026. https://www.chevron.com/newsroom/2026/q1/californias-economy-faces-threats-with-new-energy-policy-changes
- Stillwater Associates. "Stranded: West Coast Fuel Supply & Strategic Vulnerability." March 24, 2026. https://stillwaterassociates.com/stranded-west-coast-fuel-supply-strategic-vulnerability/
- OilPrice.com. "Pipeline Gaps and Refinery Shifts Expose California's Energy Vulnerability." March 6, 2026. https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Pipeline-Gaps-and-Refinery-Shifts-Expose-Californias-Energy-Vulnerability.html
- Yahoo Finance / ABC10. "California Refinery Closures Seen as US Security Risk as Valero Exits in 2026 and Gas Prices Reach $12/Gallon." December 17, 2025. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/california-refinery-closures-seen-us-234500380.html
- Institute for Energy Research. "An Aviation Fuel Crisis May Be Coming to California." February 26, 2026. https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/big-green/an-aviation-fuel-crisis-may-be-coming-to-california/
- LAEDC Institute for Applied Economics / California Energy & Fuel Policies: A Clear and Present Threat to National Security and Force Readiness? Cited in Chevron CARB comments, accessed February 22, 2026. https://laedc.org/download/oil-gas-in-california/
- Atlantic Council. "Dissolving the Fence: Improving Utility Privatization for Defense Installations' Resiliency." March 23, 2026. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/dissolving-the-fence-improving-utility-privatization-for-defense-installations-resiliency/
- Association of Defense Communities / Converge Strategies. Unleashing the Grid: Energy Dominance for National Defense. March 2025. https://defensecommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Unleashing-The-Grid-Energy-Dominance-for-National-Defense.pdf
- U.S. Senator Catherine Cortez Masto. "Cortez Masto and Mullin Introduce Bipartisan GRID Act." July 12, 2024. https://www.cortezmasto.senate.gov/es/?p=46416
- California ISO. 2025 Summer Loads and Resources Assessment. May 5, 2025. https://www.caiso.com/content/summer-loads-resources-assessment/2025/index.html
- California Energy Commission. "California Energy Leaders Report Progress on Grid Reliability Ahead of Summer 2026." May 4, 2026. https://www.energy.ca.gov/news/2026-05/california-energy-leaders-report-progress-grid-reliability-ahead-summer-2026
- CalMatters. "Cyber-Sabotage, Wildfires, Weather — A Web of Threats to the Power Supply Could Leave Californians in the Dark." April 19, 2023. https://calmatters.org/projects/threats-to-california-electricity-grid/
- LAIST / Southern California Public Radio. "California's Blackout Dilemma: Fire Safety Is Colliding with Grid Reliability." September 8, 2025. https://laist.com/brief/news/climate-environment/california-blackout-dilemma-fire-safety-is-colliding-with-grid-reliability
- Edwards Air Force Base. "California Commanders Meet at Vandenberg SFB." February 26, 2025. https://www.edwards.af.mil/News/Display/Article/4078863/california-commanders-meet-at-vandenberg-sfb/
- USAFacts. "Which States Contribute the Most and Least to Federal Revenue?" November 3, 2025. https://usafacts.org/articles/which-states-contribute-the-most-and-least-to-federal-revenue/
- Visual Capitalist. "Ranked: The Top 10 U.S. States by Defense Spending." June 3, 2025. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-top-10-u-s-states-by-defense-spending/
- Institute for Energy Research. "California's Gasoline Market May No Longer Need to Be an 'Energy Island.'" December 22, 2025. https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/fossil-fuels/gas-and-oil/californias-gasoline-market-may-no-longer-need-to-be-an-energy-island/
- Eurasia Review. "The California Refinery Crisis Is a National Security Risk for America." May 12, 2026. https://www.eurasiareview.com/12052026-the-california-refinery-crisis-is-a-national-security-risk-for-america-oped/
- Stimson Center. "Military Bases and the Green Transition." December 17, 2024. https://www.stimson.org/2024/military-bases-and-the-green-transition/
- Latham & Watkins. "Executive Order Targeting State Energy Regulations: Impacts and Responses From States." April 23, 2025. https://www.lathamreg.com/2025/04/executive-order-targeting-state-energy-regulations-impacts-and-responses-from-states/
Comments
Post a Comment